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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 990678-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
SHANNON JESS ASHCRAFT,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by
a restricted person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)
(Supp. 1997), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 1997). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied

defendant's motion for a new trial alleging prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument
where the prosecutor was responding to defendant's evidence and the trial court sustained
defendant's objection and had given a curative instruction immediately preceding the
comment?
1

Standard ofReview. The trial court is in the best position to determine the impact of
a prosecutor's remark upon the proceedings. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah
App. 1998). Accordingly, this Court will review a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new
trial alleging prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also State v. Loose,
2000 UT 11, T[ 8 (the appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial
for an abuse of discretion).
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict?

Standard of Review. The appellate court affords great deference to the jury verdict
and will not reverse a jury conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless "the evidence
is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable [people] could not possibly have reached a
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The following statute is of central importance to the appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (2) (Supp. 1997)
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device as those terms are defined in Section 76-10-306 or
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or an explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged by information with possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second degree felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
a third degree felony. R. 99: 02. A jury found defendant guilty on both counts. R. 99: 3839, 99: 171. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years
and zero-to-five years. R. 99: 45-46. The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial
which alleged that but for the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding the anonymous report
to police that defendant brandished afirearm,defendant would not have been convicted of
possession of a firearm by a restricted person. R. 47-53, 66-76, 94-96. Defendant timely
appealed. R. 97.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

An Anonymous Tip. On the evening of June 9, 1997, Officer Robert Eckman, an
agent with Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P), was shopping at the Tooele Wal-Mart. R.
99: 50, 55. While there, Officer Eckman noticed defendant drive a white minivan into a
parking stall. R. 99: 55. Officer Eckman knew defendant as a parolee under AP&P's
supervision. R. 99:51-52. Earlier that day, he had received an anonymous tip that defendant
was brandishing a firearm and making threats in public. R. 99: 51. Defendant had been
paroledfromprison just four months earlier and was prohibited under his parole agreement
from having under his control or custody anyfirearmsor dangerous weapons. R. 99:52,54.
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Despite repeated efforts, Officer Eckman had been unable to locate defendant earlier that
day. R. 99: 54-55.
Defendant's Arrest. Upon observing defendant in the parking lot, Officer Eckman
immediately returned home, obtained his weapon, and, after calling for backup, returned to
Wal-Mart in his State vehicle. R. 99: 56. Defendant was backing out of his parking stall as
Officer Eckman pulled into the parking lot. R. 99: 56. Officer Eckman activated his
overhead lights and pulled in behind defendant. R. 99: 56. Officer Travis Sutherland from
the Tooele Police Department assisted Officer Eckman in the stop, parking along side the
van. R. 99: 56-57, 84. In the van with defendant were defendant's girlfriend, Heather
Johansen, Victor Lopez, and April Garcia. R. 99: 59,105-06,112-13. Johansen was seated
in the front passenger seat of the van, Lopez sat in the middle seat directly behind defendant,
and Garcia sat next to him. R. 99: 60, 112. The officers searched defendant and all three
passengers but found no weapons. R. 99: 58-60.
Although defendant did not own the van, he had previously identified the van for
AP&P as the vehicle he would be driving. R. 99: 82-83. During a search of the van, Officer
Sutherland found a large, "fighting style" knife tucked in between the driver's seat belt
bracket and the driver's seat, readily accessible to the driver's right hand. R. 99:62-63,8486. The blade of the knife was curved with a hook on the end and the handle was lined with
spikes for striking. R. 99: 85-86. Officer Eckman also found a box filled with 44 and 38
caliber shells, both spent and unspent, in the sliding glove box under the passenger seat of
the van. R. 99: 64-65. Officers did notfinda handgun in the van. R. 99:66. Having found
4

defendant in possession of the knife, officers arrested defendant for violating his parole. See
R. 99: 66.
Search ofDefendant's Residence. Defendant had last reported to AP&P that he was
living at the residence of a girlfriend, Tabitha Patton. R.99:119-20,128-29. Accordingly,
after taking defendant into custody, Officer Eckman went to Patton's home to search for the
anonymously reported weapon. R. 99: 128. After Officer Eckman advised Patton why he
was there, she told him that he would notfinda weapon in the apartment because defendant
had not been staying there for several days. R.99:128-29. After defendant informed Officer
Eckman that he had been staying with Ms. Johansen, Eckman took defendant with him to
search her apartment for the firearm, but again failed to find a gun. R. 99: 130.
Defendant's Confession. Deputy Mike Stidham of the Tooele County Sheriffs
Office met with defendant in jail the following day. R. 99: 40, 46. After Deputy Stidham
advised defendant of his constitutional rights, defendant agreed to speak with him. R. 99:
41. Defendant told Deputy Stidham that he had purchased a .44 handgun from a friend and
that Deputy Stidham could find the gun at Ms. Johansen's home in Tooele. R. 99: 42. At
Deputy Stidham's request, defendant called Johansen and told her that Deputy Stidham
would be coming to her house to retrieve the gun. R. 99: 43.
Recovery of the Handgun. Upon Deputy Stidham's arrival, Johansen escorted him
downstairs to the handgun where it lay on the bar. R. 99: 43-44, 93. The gun was a 44
caliber Red Hawk Reuger bearing serial number 500-00864. R. 99: 70, 93. Johansen then
took the deputy to a storage room adjacent to the bar and told the deputy that defendant had
5

put the gun in the drop ceiling of the storage room. R. 99: 44, 48. After seizing the gun,
Deputy Stidham delivered it to Officer Eckman. R. 99: 45, 50.
Written Statements and a Bill of Sale. The day after defendant's arrest, Ms. Johansen
brought to AP&P an original bill of sale, signed by defendant, indicating that on June 3,
1998, Bill Besmehn sold a Reuger, Red Hawk gun, serial number 500-00864, to defendant
for $300. R. 99: 68-69. That same day, Johansen gave a note to police indicating that
defendant "left his gun in [her] possession and he never had access or never intended to have
access to his weapon." R. 99: 74. Sometime later that day, Ms. Johansen gave police
another hand-written statement which read:
I, Heather Johansen, was with Shannon Ashcraft on the 3rd day of June
1998, when he purchased the Reuger Red Hawk, serial number 500-00864,
and a box of bullets from Bill Besmehn. Shannon's friend, Bill Besmehn, had
told Shannon that he needed money to pay his rent for the month and asked if
Shannon would purchase the Reuger Red Hawk. Shannon and I both knew he
was on parole and could not have the gun in his possession. That is why the
gun was taken straight to a residence where we both felt comfortable leaving
it. The gun was in neither of our possession until June 10, 1998, when I went
and picked it up and handed it over to Officer Stidham.
R. 99: 71-74, 127-28.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Prosecutor's Remarks in Closing Argument. The prosecutor's comment in closing
argument regarding the anonymous tip did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The
State concedes that the prosecutor initially could not introduce evidence of an anonymous
tip that defendant was brandishing a firearm to prove that he had a weapon. However, when
defense counsel cross-examined the officer regarding his failure to learn the identity of the
6

anonymous caller or the accuracy of the report, he opened the door to rebuttal argument by
the prosecutor and thereby waived any subsequent challenge.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the comment was improper, any error was
harmless. The evidence establishing that defendant was in possession of a firearm was
overwhelming and included defendant's admission to police that he bought the gun, a bill of
sale evidencing his purchase of the firearm, and discovery of a box in defendant's van
containing ammunition matching the gun. Moreover, the trial court adequately instructed the
jury that evidence of the tip was admitted for the limited purpose of explaining why the
officer searched for defendant.
In light of the foregoing, no likelihood exists, let alone a reasonable likelihood, that
the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the prosecutor's remarks.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a
new trial and this Court should affirm the conviction.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict also fails. As noted above, the evidence was overwhelming that
defendant possessed a firearm. Moreover, defendant's insufficiency claim on the conviction
for possession of the knife was not preserved in the trial court below. In any case, because
the "fighting style" knife was found in defendant's van next to his seat, readily accessible to
his reach, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
A.

Procedural Background.

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude testimony of the anonymous report to AP&P
that defendant was brandishing a firearm in a white van. R. 99:2-3.* In denying the motion,
the trial court ruled that the statement was not hearsay because the State did not offer it to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that defendant had a gun, but rather to explain why
AP&P took the action it did. R. 99: 3-4.2
Consistent with the trial court's ruling, the prosecutor elicited testimony of the
anonymous tip for the purpose of explaining why Officer Eckman of AP&P was looking for
defendant and why he searched defendant's residence for a firearm. See R. 99: 51-52.
However, defense counsel inquired into the reliability of the anonymous report in his crossexamination of Officer Eckman:
Defense Counsel Now, you testified earlier that you'd received a call on
June- was it June 9th that you received the call?
Officer Eckman Yes sir.
Defense Counsel And that someone had told you that [defendant] was
brandishing a firearm, isn't [that] correct?

!

The following transcript pages are included in Addendum A: R. 99: 2-4, 51-52,
78-79, 154-56, 163-64.
2

An out-of-court statement is hearsay only if it is "offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
8

Officer Eckman They'd in [sic] use brandishing, but they said he was
exhibiting a firearm and threatening people, Yes sir.
Defense Counsel Who was it that phoned that in to you?
Officer Eckman I have no idea.
Defense Counsel You in fact, ask[ed] some follow-up questions of the
individual, isn't [that] correct?
Officer Eckman That's correct.
Defense Counsel Don't you think that it would have been important to
ascertain who that individual was?
Officer Eckman I did ask who that individual was and they refused to
provide me their name.
Defense Counsel The individual refused to provide you their name?
Officer Eckman That's correct.
Defense Counsel As a result of that, you weren't able to make any kind of
follow-up with that individual, were you?
Officer Eckman Only other than going out and checking defendant, no.
Defense Counsel But with that individual^] you weren't able to go and verify
whether or not that individual was telling the truth[,] isn't
that correct?
Officer Eckman I had no indication that she wasn't or was telling the truth.
R. 99: 78-79.
Attempting to respond to defendant's point on cross-examination, the prosecutor
conceded that the anonymous report would have been more reliable had the caller left her
name. R. 99:154. However, defendant objected before the prosecutor could continue with
his argument. R. 99: 154-55. After sustaining defendant's objection, the trial court
instructed the jury that the tip "was not admitted for the truth or falsity of the statement, but
9

simply as a basis for the position that Mr. Eckman took, and the actions he took [a]nd that
[is] all it is to be considered for, and for no other reason." R. 99: 155.
After the court instructed the jury, the prosecutor also explained to the jury that the
anonymous tip was only admitted to show why Officer Eckman went looking for defendant.
R. 99: 155. However, the prosecutor continued, arguing that the tip was verified by the bill
of sale, establishing that defendant had the gun, and the fact that defendant was driving a
white van. Defense counsel immediately objected and the trial court again sustained the
objection. R.99:156. Although defense counsel did not request another curative instruction,
he addressed the limited admissibility of the tip in his closing argument as follows:
Again, just-I will caution about the person, the unnamed person that called and
said that-that [defendant] was brandishing a gun. As the judge instructed you,
that-that was only submitted as foundation. In other words, so that your [sic]
knew what the reason was that [Officer] Eckman went out and started looking
for [defendant]. That is not evidence that he actually had possession and
control [of] the gun. The [sic] that's not to be considered as evidence by you.
R. 99: 163-64.
After sentencing, defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the prosecutor's
comments about the tip constituted prosecutorial misconduct which substantially prejudiced
defendant. R. 47-53, 67-76. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and
defendant now appeals. R. 94-96.
B.

Standard for Granting a New Trial Based on Prosecutorial
Misconduct

Because the trial court is in the best position to assess the impact of an alleged error,
this Court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct absent
10

an abuse of discretion. Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 927; Loose, 2000 UT 11, % 8. When deciding
whether a prosecutor's remark warrants reversal, this Court engages in a standard error-harm
analysis. First, the Court determines "'whether the prosecutor has called the jury's attention
to matters the jury would not be justified in considering.'" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283,
292 (Utah App. 1998) (quotingStatev. Span, 819P.2d329,335 (Utah 1991)), ajfdonother
grounds, 2000 UT 10. If the Court concludes that an improper comment was made, it then
determines "'whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, there was a probability
that the jurors were influenced by the prosecutor's remarks.'" Id. (quoting Span, 819 P.2d
at 335). Defendant has shown neither error nor harm.
C.

The Prosecutor's Comment on the Anonymous Tip Did Not
Constitute Misconduct Meriting Reversal.
1.

The Prosecutor's Comment Was Not Improper.

The trial court correctly ruled that the State could offer testimony of the anonymous
tip to explain why Officer Eckman began looking for defendant. See State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 547 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that "the victim's statements as reported by the
officer were admissible to explain why the officer took the investigative steps that he did").
Consistent with that ruling, the State elicited Officer Eckman's testimony that he began
looking for defendant on a possible parole violation when he received the anonymous tip that
defendant was brandishing afirearm.R. 99:51-52. As in Bryant, "[t]he officer's testimony
was never offered as anything other than a recital of the [ ] report of the offense and did not
purport to represent the truth of the matter asserted." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 547. Recognizing
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as much, defendant did not object to the testimony at trial and does not challenge its
admission on appeal. R. 99: 52; see Aplt. Brf. at 1-2.
Defendant claims, however, that the prosecutor's comments in closing about the
anonymous tip were improper and merit a new trial. Aplt. Brf. at 1. After acknowledging
that the tip was only offered to "lay a foundation as to why Officer Eckman went out looking
for [defendant]," the prosecutor stated:
However, that tipster's information was verified in two regards. First,
[defendant] was in fact driving a white van. And second of all, [Ms. Johansen]
gives the officer a bill of sale which she got out of the glove box apparently,
showing that [defendant], in fact, did have a gun. So we submit that the
tipster's information was verified after the fact.
R.99:155-56. Defendant immediately objected. R.99:156. Havingjust instructed the jury
that the tip could only be considered to explain why Officer Eckman took the position he did,
the trial court sustained the objection. R. 99: 155-56.
"In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the
statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial." State v.
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Thus, evidence introduced by the State or arguments made by the prosecutor that are
otherwise inadmissible may be rendered admissible and appropriate if defendant "opens the
door" by his own evidence or argument. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 31 (explaining
that "whether the prosecutor erred in inquiring into the defendant's prior riot conviction is
dependent upon whether the 'defendant opened the door' to the prosecutor's inquiry by his
own testimony"); see, e.g., State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,157 (Utah App. 1997) (holding
12

that by arguing for acquittal based on the State's failure to secure a witness, defendant
opened the door to the prosecutor's remark that defendant could have subpoenaed the
witness); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that defendant
opened the door to prosecutor's questioning about the specifics of a prior forgery conviction
where defendant misstated the facts and tried to explain away the conviction); State v.
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,925 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that it was not misconduct for the
prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to participate in a lineup where the
defendant opened the door by arguing that a lineup was not conducted).
By "opening the door," a defendant waives the right to challenge any related evidence
or argument propounded by the State. See State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah App.
1994) (holding that the defendant cannot appeal the admission of a mug shot because he
opened the door to its admission when he elicited testimony regarding its existence on crossexamination). As observed by the Kansas Supreme Court, "when a defendant opens an
otherwise inadmissible area of evidence during the examination of witnesses, the prosecution
may then present evidence in that formerly forbidden sphere." State v. Johnson, 905 P.2d
94, 100 (Kan. 1995). Recognizing such a waiver "prevents] one party in a criminal trial
from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that,
without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression."
People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84,98-99 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
As explained, the State could not offer in evidence the anonymous tip to prove the
truth of the matter asserted-that defendant possessed a gun-and it did not do so when the
13

prosecutor questioned Officer Eckman. However, defendant placed the reliability of the tip
directly in issue, and thus opened the door to the prosecutor's response, when defense
counsel cross-examined Officer Eckman. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited
testimonyfromOfficer Eckman that he was unable to learn the identity of the caller or verify
the accuracy of the report. R. 99: 78-79. By questioning Officer Eckman about the
reliability of the tip, defense counsel opened the door to argument from the prosecutor
countering defendant's suggestion that the tip was not reliable. Accordingly, the prosecutor's
comment that the tip was verified by the bill of sale and the fact defendant was driving a
white van did not constitute misconduct.
2.

Even If Improper, the Prosecutor's Comment Did Not
Substantially Prejudice Defendant

Even if the prosecutor's comment regarding the anonymous tip were judged improper,
defendant has failed to show he was harmed by the comment. Where, as here, the alleged
error "does not impact a federal constitutional right, the test used for determining an error's
harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error a different result
would have occurred." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1992). Here, the evidence
was compelling and no likelihood exists, let alone a reasonable likelihood, that defendant
would have been acquitted absent the prosecutor's remarks.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 1997), a convicted felon on parole
"may not have in his possession or under his custody or control any... dangerous weapon."
The gun Ms. Johansen surrendered to police at the direction of defendant was undeniably a
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dangerous weapon and defendant has not claimed otherwise. See State v. Davis, 711 P.2d
232, 234 (Utah 1985) (holding that an unloaded 22 caliber pistol is a dangerous weapon).
The evidence establishing that defendant had "in his possession or under his custody
or control" the 44 caliber Red Hawk Reuger handgun was substantial. Indeed, the
prosecutor's comment paled in significance to the weight of the evidence supporting the
conviction. Defendant admitted to Officer Stidham that he had purchased the 44 caliber
handgun from a friend. R. 99:42. Ms. Johansen produced a bill of sale dated only six days
before defendant's arrest showing that defendant bought the gun found at Johansen's home.
R. 99:68-69. Defendant told Officer Stidham that the gun was at the home of Ms. Johansen,
with whom he had been staying at the time. R. 99: 42, 130. At defendant's direction,
Johansen surrendered the gun to police and showed police the drop ceiling where defendant
had put the gun. R. 99:43-44,48,93. Finally, a box containing 44 caliber shells, both spent
and unspent, was found in the van driven by defendant. R. 99: 64-65, 82-83. These facts
conclusively establish that defendant possessed the weapon, controlling its use and
management. See Davis, 711 P.2d at 233.
Moreover, any conceivable harm occasioned by the prosecutor's comment on the
anonymous tip was obviated by the trial court in its instruction to the jury just before the
comment. Defendant acknowledges the court's curative instruction, but argues that because
it came before the challenged comment, it did not cure the harm. However, a review of the
exchange reveals that the trial court adequately addressed any error. The exchange
proceeded as follows:
15

Judge
This statement that was admitted was not admitted for the truth or falsity of the
statement, but simply as a basis for the position that Mr. Eckman took, and the
actions he took [a]nd that [is] all it is to be considered for, and for no other
reason.
Prosecutor
In other words, we're not alleging that [defendant] was actually brandishing
the firearm, because we didn't have anybody who saw him do that. We don't
have that person's name. But because of that tip, we wanted to find
[defendant], and find out what he was doing and why he-whether, in fact, he
had a gun. And that's all that information was being admitted for. It's to lay
a foundation as to why Officer Eckman went out looking for him. However,
that tipster's information was verified in two regards. First, [defendant] was
in fact driving a white van. And second of all, Heather gives the officer a bill
of sale which she got out of the glove box apparently, showing that
[defendant], in fact, did have a gun. So we submit that the tipster's
information was verified after the fact.
Defense Counsel
The same objection, Your Honor.
Judge
Sustained.
R. 99: 155-56. Defense counsel did not seek another instruction. R. 99: 156.
Because the trial court sustained defendant's objection which immediately followed
the prosecutor's comment, and because the court's instruction was given just moments before
the challenged comment, the jury must have understood the nature of the objection and the
reason it was sustained. Unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable
to follow an instruction given by the trial court and a strong likelihood that the improper
evidence or statement was devastating to defendant, this Court will presume that the jury

16

followed the instruction. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,273 (Utah 1998) {citing Greer
v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,767 n. 8,107 S.Ct. 3102,3109 n. 8 (1987)). Nothing here suggests
that the jury could not or did not follow the instruction.
Moreover, defense counsel had the last word on the subject, reiterating for the jury in
his closing argument the trial court's instruction directing the jury to consider evidence of
the tip only to explain why the officer looked for defendant. R. 99: 163-64. It should also
be noted that the prosecutor's remarks did not misstate the facts. That defendant was driving
a white van and that a bill of sale evidenced defendant's purchase of the gun were facts
properly before the court and well known to the jury.
Given the compelling, direct evidence of defendant's possession of the gun and the
trial court's sustaining of defendant's objection, just moments after it's curative instruction
to the jury, no likelihood exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had
the prosecutor not commented on the anonymous tip.
* * *

Because the prosecutor's comment on the anonymous tip was proper, and because any
harm occasioned by the comment was negligible in any event, the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. In short, it cannot be said that the
trial court's ruling was so unreasonable and plainly wrong that defendant was denied a fair
trial by virtue of the prosecutor's comment. See State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah
App. 1996), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, defendant's claim fails
and this Court should affirm the conviction.
17

IL

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
VERDICT.
Defendant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Aplt.

Brf. at 2. Like his misconduct claim, however, defendant's insufficiency claim also fails.
The appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder, determine guilt or innocence,
or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231; State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1991). The jury alone weighs the evidence and determines
the credibility of witnesses. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. Accordingly, when reviewing an
insufficiency claim, the appellate court "view[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 233 (Utah 1992).
The Court will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence "only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded by
rule on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). In other words, the Court
will sustain a jury verdict so long as there is "any evidence or reasonable inferences that can
be drawnfromthe evidencefromwhich the jury could make findings of all the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992).
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A.

The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Jury's Verdict
Finding Defendant Guilty of Possessing a Firearm.

The evidence in this case, together with all inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence, is more than sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm
by a restricted person. As discussed infra, at pp. 15-16, the evidence was overwhelming that
the gun was in defendant's "possession or under his custody or control." See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503(2). Defendant's admission, the bill of sale, defendant's directive to
Johansen to surrender the weapon to police, and the box of ammunition together provided
more than sufficient evidence of defendant's guilt.3
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient given the testimony of Heather
Johansen and Bill Besmehn, the person identified on the bill of sale as the seller of the gun.
Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. According to them, the gun was not actually sold, but rather used as
collateral for a loan from defendant so Besmehn could pay his rent. R. 99:94-96,107. They
also claimed that defendant never had actual possession of the gun nor the ability to control
the gun. R. 99: 96-97, 109. The jury, however, "is not obliged to believe the claims of
defendant's witnesses." Davis, 711 P.2d at 234. Where, as here, the testimony of a
defendant's witnesses is fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions, the Court must
"assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict," rejecting defendant's
version of events. State v. DunnfiSO P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993). Indeed, the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of Johansen and Besmehn only bolstered
3

That defendant was a restricted person under the statute is undisputed. See also
R. 99: 51-52, 54.
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the State's case. See State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232,1235 (Utah 1986), State v. Gellatly, 449
P.2d 993,995 n.2 (Utah 1969).
Johansen testified that defendant loaned Besmehn $300 so he could pay his rent and
that Besmehn agreed to use the gun "for more or less reinsurance that he would pay
[defendant] back." R. 99: 107. However, Johansen discounted any role she had in the
alleged loan, twice testifying that she "wasn't paying much attention" to the discussion
between defendant and Besmehn regarding the loan. R. 99: 107, 117. On the other hand,
Besmehn's testimony elevated Johansen's role in the alleged loan. Referring to defendant
and Johansen, Besmehn testified that "they" agreed to loan him the money, but added that
the agreement was "actually with [Johansen]." R. 99: 94, 96. Besmehn also testified that
defendant knew he was good for the loan and would repay him and that it was Johansen who
demanded collateral. R.99:102. Yet, Johansen testified that giving the gun as collateral was
not her idea and that she "didn't want anything to do with it." R. 99: 109, 117.4
The testimony of Johansen and Besmehn also contradicted statements they made to
police. For example, the day after defendant's arrest, Johansen gave police a written note
indicating that defendant "left his gun in [her] possession." R. 99: 74 (emphasis added).
This statement not only implies that defendant personally gave the gun to Ms. Johansen, but
also demonstrates her understanding that the gun belonged to defendant. Johansen gave

4

Another inconsistency in their testimony included the time in which the loan
should be repaid. Ms. Johansen testified that the loan would be repaid in about a month,
R. 99: 116, but Besmehn testified that "it was supposed to be just a week loan." R. 99:
102.
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police yet another written statement indicating she was with defendant "when he purchased
the Reuger Red Hawk, serial number 500-00864, and a box of bullets from Bill Besmehn."
R. 99: 72 {see, infra at p. 7, for the text of the full statement). Nothing in this statement
suggests that the gun was simply collateral, but rather it confirms defendant's purchase of
the gun. Mention of the box of bullets also strengthens the link between the 44 caliber shells
found in defendant's van and the gun. Moreover, although Besmehn told police that
defendant was only holding the weapon because he had loaned Besmehn $300, he could not
explain the bill of sale evidencing defendant's purchase of the gun. R. 99:76. Remarkably,
with just over a year to think about it, Besmehn testified that the bill of sale was executed to
prevent him from claiming the gun was stolen in order to get the gun back. R. 99: 94, 99.
Given the overwhelming weight of the State's evidence and the contradictory and
inconsistent testimony of defendant's witnesses, which only bolstered the State's already
compelling evidence, it cannot be said that the evidence was "so lacking and insubstantial
that reasonable [people] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt." Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. Accordingly, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for possessing a firearm.
B.

Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim That the Evidence Was
Insufficient to Establish He Possessed the Knife.

Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish he possessed the
knife. Aplt. Brf. at 2. However, because he did not raise this claim in the trial court, he is
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal.
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The appellate courts have long adhered to the rule that issues not raised at trial,
including constitutional issues, will not be considered for thefirsttime on appeal absent plain
error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).
Where, as here, a "defendant 'does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain
error" justifies a review of the[se] issue[s],' this court will 'decline to consider [them] on
appeal.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d at 547 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n. 5 (Utah
1995)) (brackets in original).
The principle underlying the preservation requirement in general "is that in the interest
of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed
error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Eldredge, 111 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989), cert
denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814,110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). The same principle applies in
the requirement that a defendant preserve an insufficiency claim. In fact, the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide a number of ways in which a defendant may bring an
insufficiency claim before the trial court. Rule 17 provides:
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o). Likewise, rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides an
avenue for an arrest ofjudgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public
offense." A motion for. a new trial may also be used to bring an insufficiency claim before
the trial court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24.
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Defendant failed to preserve his claim in the trial court below. He did not move for
a directed verdict under rule 17 nor did he move for an arrest of judgment under rule 23.
Although he filed a motion for a new trial, he limited his insufficiency claim to possession
of afirearmby a restricted person. See R. 47-53,67-76. On appeal, defendant neither asserts
plain error nor exceptional circumstances, and therefore, this Court should not address his
insufficiency claim on appeal. See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 547.
Even on its merits, however, defendant's claim fails. This Court has observed that
"[i]n order to establish constructive possession, the prosecution must prove 'that there was
a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [item] to permit an inference that the accused
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the [item]."9 State
v. Rivera, 906 P.2d 318,319 (Utah App. 1995), rev 'don other grounds, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah
1997) (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)) (brackets in original).
Here, the evidence amply supported defendant's conviction for possession of the knife
and was neither insubstantial nor inconclusive. The evidence established that the knife was
found next to the driver's seat in the van which defendant reported to AP&P he would be
driving and which he was driving at the time of arrest. R. 99: 62-63, 82-86. Moreover, the
knife was well within the reach of the driver's right hand. See R. 99: 86. Although
defendant's witnesses testified that the knife was that of a passenger sitting behind defendant,
the appellate court must assume that the jury, as the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses, rejected their testimony. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1213. In short, the evidence was
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not "so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable [people] could not possibly have reached
a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirr"
defendant's convictions.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
(R. 99: 2-4, 51-52, 78-79,154-56,163-64)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
2
3

Judge Dever:
Ashcraft matter?

Are we ready on the Shannon

What's the status

4

(inaudible)audible)

5

to proceed on this matter?

6

matters to be raised?

7

Mr. Freestone:

8

9
10

Judge Dever:
981300353.

Are there any preliminary

Yeah, Your Honor, I just have

Okay.

This is case No.

Shannon Jess Ashcraft, is your name?

Ms. Ashcraft:

12

Judge Dever:

14

Are we ready

one issue that -- that we need to deal with probably.

11

13

Just have a seat.

Yes Sir.
Okay.

And what's happening here

counsel?
Mr. Freestone:

Your Honor, we're prepared to

15

go to trial.

I just had a quick Motion in Limine I'd

16

like to bring.

17

by Officer Eckman. In his report it states that he

18

received a call from, apparently some unknown female

19

who said that Mr. Ashcraft was brandishing a gun in a

20

white vehicle somewhere.

21

have any knowledge who this person was.

22

(inaudible)audible) in anticipation of him testifying

23

to that, we'd like to object and make sure that

24

there's a ruling on that before it comes up.

25

be very prejudicial.

This is in anticipation of testimony

To my knowledge, they don't

It could

Our objection would be...
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1
2

Judge Dever:

the truth of the matter contained is it?

3

Mr. Jeppesen:

4

Judge Dever:

5
6

Well, it's not offered to prove

That's correct.

It's...

It's being just offered to show

why Mr. Eckman did what he did?
Mr. Freestone:

Well, it certainly would be

7

prejudicial and could be used as proof of the matter.

8

The whole issue here is whether or not he ever had

9

possession of a firearm.

10

Judge Dever:

11

Mr. Jeppesen:

Mr. Jeppesen?
I submit that it is not being

12

offered -- it's not hearsay because it's not being

13

offered to prove that he had the gun at the time, but

14

only as to why the probation office was so concerned

15

about looking for the defendant.

16

officer subsequently went back on duty after hours to

17

locate him.

And the fact why the

18

Mr. Freestone:

I don't think that that's...

19

Mr. Jeppesen:

Otherwise we have no reason for

20
21

stopping him in the first place.
Judge Dever:

Well I don't think that it's

22

being offered to show that he had a gun, it's being

23

offered to show why the probation department took the

24

action that they took.

25

How else are you going to

explain to the jury what's happening here?
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1

probation officer is going to get on the standard

2

testify is he not?

3

that Mr. Ashcraft was engaged in an activity that was

4

prohibited.

5

That he received a telephone call

And so he went looking for him.

Mr. Freestone:

And engaged in an activity

6

that was prohibited would be fine, but he specifically

7

says that he received a telephone call and that person

8

said that he was brandishing a firearm, you know,

9

that's hearsay and that is definitely prejudicial.

10

Mr. Jeppesen:

Well that fact is that when he

11

was stopped, the gun was not found in the vehicle and

12

yet the officers continued to press as to where the

13

firearm was.

14

with the Defendant we were able to find it.

15

without that explanation why would they even be

16

looking for a firearm?

17

And in fact, then, because of speaking

Judge Dever:

And

Well, Mr. Freestone, I think

18

that it's not hearsay.

19

the officers did what they did.

20

explanation the jury is not going to understand why

21

they were looking for something.

22

your objection.

23

Mr. Freestone:

24

Judge Dever:

25

I think that it explains why
And without that

So I'll overrule

Thank you Your Honor.

Are we ready to proceed?

Mr. Freestone: We are
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1

Probation and Parole for eight years, almost nine

2

years.

3

a Category One police officer on some of the things

4

that were happening in corrections.

5

Just recently, two years ago, was certified as

Mr. Jeppesen:

Prior to becoming a parole

6

agent, I understand you were a security -- or a guard

7

at the prison?

8

Officer Eckman:

9

Mr. Jeppesen:

How many years did you do that?

10

Officer Eckman:

11

Mr. Jeppesen:

12

Approximately 2 1/2.

Thank you.

Now, are you

acquainted with the dependent, Shannon Ashcraft?

13

Officer Eckman:

14

Mr. Jeppesen:

15

Yes sir.

Yes sir.

And with relation to this case,

how did you first become aware of him?

16

Officer Eckman:

17

Mr. Jeppesen:

18

Officer Eckman:

With this case?

Uh-huh.
I had received a telephone

19

call on June 9th indicating that the subject had been

20

brandishing a firearm in front of different people in

21

the community and making threads toward them.

22

vehicle was described, and I couldn't get a

23

description on the types of weapons, but they did say

24

that he was brandishing firearms.

25

The

Mr. Jeppesen: And were you aware as to his
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status on the date?
2

Officer Eckman:

3

Mr. Jeppesen:

4

Officer Eckman:

5

And what was that?

Mr. Jeppesen:
parole?

That's when he was released on

In February?

8

Officer Eckman:

9

Mr. Jeppesen:

10

supervising agent?
Officer Eckman:

12

Mr. Jeppesen:

13

Officer Eckman:

14

Mr. Jeppesen:

16

That's correct.

And were you his direct

11

15

He was on parole to us -- had

parole from the Utah state prison in February 1998.

6
7

Yes sir.

No sir.

And who was his agent?
Mike Hansen.

Alright.

When you received

this information over the phone, what did you do?
Officer Eckman:

I shared the information with

17

the only other agent in the office, who was Lonnie

18

Walters.

19

and look for him and the vehicle.

20

determination fi there were weapons in the vehicle.

21
22
23
24
25

It was then determined that we should go out

Mr. Jeppesen:

Alright.

And try and make a

His supervising agent

wasn't available that day?
Officer Eckman:

He was off on that day, I

believe.
Mr. Jeppesen: I'll show you what's marked as
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a restricted person, is that correct?
Officer Eckman:
Mr. Freestone:

As I understand it# yes sir.
And he has not been charged

here today with purchase of a firearm by a restricted
person, isn't that correct?
Officer Eckman:

That's correct, yes sir.

Mr. Freestone:

Now, you testified earlier

that you'd received a call on June -- was it June 9th
that you received the call?
Officer Eckman:
Mr. Freestone:

Yes sir.
And that someone had told you

that Mr. Ashcraft was brandishing a firearm, isn't
correct?
Officer Eckman:

They'd in use brandishing,

but they said he was exhibiting a firearm and
threatening people, Yes sir.
Mr. Freestone:

Who was it that phoned that in

to you?
Officer Eckman:
Mr. Freestone:

I have no idea.
You in fact, ask some follow-

up questions of the individual, isn't correct?
Officer Eckman:
Mr. Freestone:

That's correct.
Don't you think that it would

have been important to ascertain who that individual
was?
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I did ask who that individual

Officer Eckman:

1

was and they refused to provide me their name.

2

The individual refused to

Mr, Freestone:

3

I
I
J

provide you their name?

4
5

Officer Eckman:

6

Mr. Freestone:

That's correct.
As a result of that, you

7

weren't able to make any kind of follow-up with that

8

individual, were you?
Officer Eckman:

9

Only other than going out and

10

checking the defendant,, no.

11

Mr. Freestone:

But with that individual you

12

weren't able to go and verify whether or not that

13

individual was telling the truth isn't that correct?
Officer Eckman:

14

I had no indication that she

wasn't or was telling the truth.

15

Mr. Freestone:

16

Now when you, in fact,

17

requested that Shannon exit the vehicle, at that time,

18

you testified there were four individuals in the

19

vehicle, correct?

20

Officer Eckman:

21

Mr. Freestone:

Yes sir.
Okay.

who was seated directly behind Shannon, isn't that

23

correct?
Officer Eckman:

25 1

Mr. Freestone:

1

There was an individual

22

24

I

1

Yes sir.
That individual's name is

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

|

Multi-Page TM

Page 154
aware that everything they had said was incriminating
Shannon.

Bill Besmehn gives Shannon a document which

he freely admits appears to be a bill of sale.

He is

listed as the seller and the defendant as the buyer.
He admits that Shannon's the one who gave him to $300.
As to the knife, we really submit that there's not
much argument over the knife.

Now, the knife was

right next Shannon's body as he sat in the seat, in
the seat belt holder next to him where all he had to
do was reach down with one hand and pull it up out of
scabbard.

If that isn't being in possession or having

dominion and control, I don't know what is.
accessible to his right hand at any time.

It was

Now the

defendant makes a point on cross-examination that the
person who called in the tip that Shannon was
brandishing a firearm, or threatening people with it,
when he was in the white van, didn't leave a name.
And of course if a person leaves their name we're
going to give them a little more credibility than
someone who doesn't.
Mr. Freestone:

But put yourself...
Your Honor, I'm going to

object to this - to this closing statement regarding
the statement of the unidentified person.

The reason

that was admitted, if you recall, was for foundation,
not for truth of the matter asserted.
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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1

he's arguing that truthful matter asserted.

2

Judge Dever:

Well, ladies and gentlemen...

3

Mr. Jeppesen:

I don't think I'm doing that

4

Your Honor, that's not my intent.
Judge Dever:

5

This statement that was admitted

6

was not admitted for the truth or falsity of the

7

statement, but simply as a basis for the position that

8

Mr. Eckman took, and the actions he took.

9

all it is to be considered for, and for no other

10

And that

reason.
Mr. Jeppesen:

11

In other words, we're not

12

alleging that Shannon was actually brandishing the

13

firearm, because we didn't have anybody who saw him do

14

that.

15

of that tip, we wanted to find Shannon Ashcraft, and

16

find out what he was doing and why he -- whether, in

17

fact, he had a gun.

18

information was being admitted for.

19

foundation as to why Officer Eckman went out looking

20

for him.

21

verified in two regards.

22

driving a white van.

23

the officer a bill of sale which she got out of the

24

glove box apparently, showing that Shannon, in fact,

25

did have a gun.

We don't have that person's name.

But, because

And that's all that that
It's to lay a

However, that tipster's information was
First, Shannon was in fact

And second of all, Heather gives

So we submit that the tipster's
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information was verified after the fact.
Mr. Freestone:

The same objection, Your

Honor.
Judge Dever:

Sustained.

Mr. Jeppesen:

Now, Bill Besmehn, he

immediately indicates that the defendant is his good
buddy.

And obviously he doesn't want his good buddy

to get in trouble.

He recognizes the Rueger Red Hawk.

He indicated that he and Heather came over to see him
about the gun.

Why would they come over to see about

the gun if, in fact, Bill is trying to get a loan from
them, and then later, they decide to use the gun as
collateral?
that regard.

I submit that his story doesn't jive in
Heather, as you will recall, says that

Shannon alone was the one who made the deal for the
loan.

She wasn't there.

Bill says that they both

came over when Shannon paid the $300.

He gave -

Shannon gave him the $300, but didn't take the
collateral.

Does that stand reason?

Would a person

do that if they were taking the gun as collateral, why
would they leave it will be the borrower?

His bill of

sale specifically designates, of course again, that
Shannon's the buyer.

The loan transaction only came

up a month later after the defendant had been arrested
and put in jail. Heather indicated that the loan was
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1

parole.

And then the testimony was that, on the third

2

day, Heather goes up and retrieves the gun herself.

3

She brings it back and she leaves it with her mother's

4

boyfriend.

5

safe.

6

because Shannon called, at the request of Officer

7

Stidham, and asked her to turn the gun over to Officer

8

Stidham, that that somehow indicates that he had

9

possession and control over the gun.

He was indicating that he'd keep it in his

Now, it was suggested by the State that,

What does the

10

State expect?

11

cooperated.

12

return this over?

But what's important is, he called

13

Heather Johansen.

He didn't call her mother's

14

boyfriend.

15

knew that's where the gun was.

16

had asked her to go up and get the gun, so he knew

17

that she had possession and control of the gun.

18

Again, just -- I will caution about the person,

19

unnamed person that called and said that -- that Mr.

20

Ashcraft was brandishing a gun.

21

instructed you, that - that was only submitted as

22

foundation.

23

the reason was that Mr. Eckman went out and started

24

looking for Mr. Ashcraft.

25

Did he would refuse to do that?

He

He called her and said, you know, would

I mean, there's no evidence that he even
But he knew that he

the

As the Judge

In other words, so that your knew what

That is not evidence that

he actually had possession and control the gun.
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1

that's not to be considered as evidence by you.

2

So, in the Wal-Mart parking lot, Mr. Ashcraft and the

3

occupants of the car are stopped.

4

searched.

5

the car.

6

- they do find a knife and Victor Lopez admits, right

7

there, that that knife is his.

8

front of him.

9

that that was within the reach of Mr. Ashcraft.

Okay.

No firearm in his possession.
It's not on his person.

Okay.

The car is
It's not in

Okay, they do find

and its placed right

A lot of "to do" is made by the State
Well,

10

Yeah, it was, but it was also right there within the

11

reach of Victor Lopez who set it down right front of

12

him.

13

pointed out that -- that Heather's testimony was she

14

went and got the gun from where she had stored it, and

15

took it into the storage room and she put it on the

16

shelf.

17

on the shelf, she said, was to keep it away from the

18

reach of children.

19

she knew how long it was going to take for Officer

20

Stidham to get there.

21

got there, then she went in and got it put it, only it

22

was later on whenever Officer Stidham came, she went

23

and got it and put it on the bar.

24

pointed out some inconsistencies between what Bill

25

Besmehn said about arriving at the agreement to loan
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That's where he was seated.

Now, the State also

Now, if you will remember the reason she put

Now, there was no indication that

And then when Officer Stidham

Now, the State

